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Abstract: The role that system structuring techniques plays in helping to cope with 
system complexity and achieve system dependability is analyzed. This leads 
on to a discussion of (i) the problems of the various kinds of assumptions, 
both deliberate and unthinking, that are made by system designers, (ii) the 
increased difficulties regarding such assumptions that can face the designers 
of complex systems that are intended to function as infrastructures, and (iii) 
the problems of defending systems and infrastructures against malicious 
attacks, including those which cause initially-unsuspected structural damage. 
Keywords: Dependability, Information Infrastructure, Structure, Failures, 
Malicious Faults, Systems-of-Systems. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Governments, industry and the public at large are becoming ever more 
dependent on a global information infrastructure that is made up of countless 
inter-linked computer systems. Yet this infrastructure can best be described as 
fragile, rather than dependable. This is due not just to the immense size and 
complexity of this information infrastructure and hence the number of faults 
that occurs almost unavoidably. Rather, it is also due to the damage this 
infrastructure suffers from the activities of a seemingly ever-increasing 
number of criminals and hackers. 
Unfortunately the current less than satisfactory situation is likely to 
deteriorate as the global information infrastructure expands to encompass 
large numbers of huge networked computer systems, perhaps involving 
everything from super-computers and massive server “farms” to myriads of 
small mobile computers and tiny embedded devices. Yet in many cases such 
systems will be expected by the governments and by the large industrial 
organizations that aim to install them, and indeed by the general public that 
will have to interact with them, to function highly dependably and essentially 
continuously. This at any rate would be the consequence should various 
current industrial and government plans –see for example [European 
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Commission 2002]– come to fruition. Such plans have been formulated 
despite the fact that the envisaged systems, and hence the information 
infrastructure that they both rely on and help constitute, seem certain to be far 
more complex than today’s global information infrastructure. 
2. SOME STATISTICS 
The present situation is perhaps best illustrated by the following sample 
claims and statistics relating to the (un)dependability of the global 
information infrastructure: 
• The average cost per hour of computer system downtime across thirty 
domains such as banking, manufacturing, retail, health insurances, 
securities, reservations, etc., has recently been estimated at nearly 
$950,000 by the US Association of Contingency Planners 2.) 
• The French Insurer’s Association has estimated that the yearly cost of 
computer failures is 1.5 –1.8B Euro (10 – 12B Francs), of which 
slightly more than half is due to deliberately-induced faults (e.g. by 
hackers and corrupt insiders) [Laprie 1999]. 
• The July 2003 report on “Government IT Projects” [Pearce 2003] 
states that in the UK: “Over the past five years, high profile IT 
difficulties have affected the Child Support Agency, Passport Office, 
Criminal Records Bureau, Inland Revenue, National Air Traffic 
Services and the Department of Work and Pensions, among others.” 
• Networking dependability is if anything decreasing: “The availability 
that was typically achievable by (wired) telecommunication services 
and computer systems in the 90s was 99.999% – 99.9%. Now cellular 
phone services, and web-based services, typically achieve an 
availability of only 99% – 90%.” [AMSD Roadmap 2003] 
• The problem of deliberate attacks on networked computer systems, 
and potentially via them on other major infrastructures, which is 
already serious is growing rapidly, as evidenced by SEI/CERT's 
statistics on annual numbers of incident reports: 9,859 (1999), 52,568 
(2001), 137,529 (2003). 
• Price Waterhouse Cooper's “Information Security Breaches Survey 
2002” for the UK Dept. of Trade and Industry states that “44% of UK 
businesses have suffered at least one malicious security breach in the 
past year, nearly twice as many as in the 2000 survey”. 3 
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3. DEPENDABILITY 
The very concepts of ‘dependability’ and ‘failure’ [Avizienis et al. 
2004] need careful definition in order to make sense of the problems that can 
afflict a system whose very complexity is a major cause of difficulties. For 
our purposes here the following will suffice:  
Dependability is the ability to avoid failures that are more 
frequent and more severe than is acceptable,  
where: 
A system, operating in some particular environment, may fail in 
the sense that some other system makes or could, in principle, 
have made a judgement that the activity or inactivity of the 
given system constitutes failure.  
The above definitions are based essentially on just two basic concepts, namely 
‘system’, and ‘judgement’, for each of which any standard dictionary 
definition will suffice 4.  
The judgemental system is a potential or actual observer of the given 
system, and may be an automated system, a user or an operator, a relevant 
judicial authority, or whatever. This judgemental system may or may not have 
a fully detailed system specification to guide it, though evidently one would 
expect such a document to be available to guide the system construction task. 
Ideally such a specification would be complete, consistent, and accurate – in 
practice there are likely to be many occasions when it is the specification 
rather than, or as well as, the specified system which is judged as failing.  
Different judgemental systems might, of course, come to different 
decisions regarding whether and how the given system has failed, or might 
fail in the future, in differing circumstances and from different stakeholders’ 
viewpoints. The crucial issue might, for example, concern the accuracy of the 
results that are produced, the continuity or timeliness of service, or the 
success with which sensitive information is kept private. Indeed, it is likely to 
concern some balanced combination of such attributes. (Thus, especially with 
highly complex systems, the notion of what constitutes a failure and whether 
one has occurred can often be quite subjective.)  
Moreover, such a judgemental system might itself fail in the eyes of 
some other judgemental system, a possibility that is well understood by the 
legal system, with its hierarchy of courts. So, there is a (recursive) notion of 
‘failure’, which clearly is a relative rather than an absolute notion. So then is 
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the concept of dependability, at any rate when one is dealing with hugely 
complex systems. 
It is in fact necessary to distinguish between three basic concepts – 
‘failure’, ‘error’ and ‘fault’.  
An error is that part of the system state that is liable to lead to 
subsequent failure; an error affecting the service that is being 
provided by a system is an indication that a failure occurs or has 
occurred. The adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error is a 
fault.  
Note (i) that an error may be judged to have multiple causes (for 
example the occurrence of an attempted attack on the system, and the 
existence of an exploitable vulnerability within the system, left there by a 
failing system design and implementation process), and (ii) an error does not 
necessarily lead to a failure (for example, error recovery might be attempted 
successfully and failure averted).  
Thus a failure occurs when an error ‘passes through’ the observation 
interface and affects the service delivered by the system; a system being 
composed of components that are themselves systems. The manifestation of 
failures, faults and errors follows a ‘fundamental chain’: 
… → failure → fault → error → failure fault → … 
Such chains can exist within systems. System failures might be due to 
faults that exist because, for example, of the failure of a component (i.e. sub-
system) to meet its specification. 
However, these chains also exist between separate systems. For 
instance, a failure of a system-design system (constituted by a human design 
team together with their computer facilities and tools) might result in the 
wrong choice of component being made in the system that is being designed, 
resulting in a fault in this latter system that leads eventually to its failure. 
Also, a system might fail because of the inputs that it receives from some 
other system with which it is interacting, though ideally it will be capable of 
checking its inputs thoroughly enough to minimize such failures.  
By having separate terms for the three essentially different concepts – 
‘fault’, ‘error’ and ‘failure’ – one has a chance of dealing properly with the 
complexities and realities of failure-prone components, being assembled 
together in possibly incorrect ways, so resulting in systems which in reality 
will still be somewhat failure-prone.  
Note that with highly complex networked systems (i) there are likely to 
be uncertainties and arguments about system boundaries, (ii) the very 
complexity of the system (and its specification, if it has one) can be a major 
problem, (iii) judgements as to possible causes or consequences of failure can 
be subtle and disputable and (iv) any provisions for preventing faults from 
causing failures are themselves almost certainly fallible.  
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The above definitions, in clarifying the distinction in particular between 
fault and failure, lead to the identification of the four basic means of obtaining 
and establishing high dependability, namely: 
• fault prevention - prevention of the occurrence or introduction of 
faults, in particular, via the use of rigorous design methods; 
• fault tolerance - the means of delivery of correct service in the 
presence of faults; 
• fault removal - that is, verification and validation, aimed at reducing 
the number or severity of faults; and 
• fault forecasting - system evaluation, via estimation of the present 
number, the future incidence and the likely consequences of faults.  
With less than perfect (i.e. real) systems, in the absence of (successful) 
fault tolerance, failures may occur and will presumably need to be tolerated 
somehow by the encompassing (possibly socio-technical) system. However, 
this notion of ‘failure tolerance’ is just fault tolerance at the next system level.  
Note, however, that one of the most important lessons from work over 
many years on system dependability is the fact that fault prevention, removal 
and tolerance should not be regarded as alternatives, but rather as 
complementary technologies, all of which have a role to play, and whose 
effective combination is crucial – with fault forecasting being used to evaluate 
the degree of success that is being achieved.  
4. ASSUMPTIONS, ASSUMPTIONS, . . .  
System designers always make (possibly arbitrary or unthinking) 
assumptions concerning, for example: (i) the types and relative frequencies of 
the faults that might occur, (ii) the effectiveness with which the various 
dependability means are being deployed, (iii) the relative importance of 
various (somewhat antagonistic) dependability attributes: reliability, 
availability, integrity, security, etc., and (iv) the accuracy of any dependability 
predictions. 
The problems of preventing faults in systems from leading to system 
failures, and of minimising the severity of failures that do occur, vary greatly 
in difficulty depending on these assumptions. For example, one might choose 
to assume that (i) operational hardware faults can be cost-effectively masked 
(i.e. hidden) by the use of hardware replication and voting, and (ii) any 
residual software design faults can be similarly masked by the use of design 
diversity, i.e. using N-version programming, provided of course that the 
assumption is correct. In such circumstances error recovery is not needed. In 
many realistic situations, however, if the likelihood of a failure is to be kept 
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within acceptable bounds, error recovery facilities will have to be provided, in 
addition to whatever fault prevention and fault masking techniques are used. 
The notion of coverage is of relevance to the problem of justifying any 
such assumptions. In its general sense, coverage refers to a measure of the 
representativeness of the situations to which a system is subjected during its 
analysis (e.g. in the case of software by means of code inspection, static 
checking, and program testing) compared to the actual situations that the 
system will be confronted with during its operational life. This notion of 
coverage may be made more precise by indicating its range of application, 
e.g., coverage of a software test with respect to the software text, control 
graph, etc., coverage of an integrated circuit test with respect to a fault model, 
coverage of fault tolerance with respect to a class of faults, and, most 
significantly, coverage of a fault assumption with respect to reality. 
By way of an example of the importance of the choice of fault 
assumptions, consider the problems of error recovery in decentralised 
systems. If the designer of a distributed database system disallows (i.e. 
ignores) the possibility of undetected invalid inputs or outputs, the errors that 
have to be recovered from will essentially all be ones that are wholly within 
the system. In this situation backward error recovery (i.e. recovery to an 
earlier, it is hoped error-free, state) will suffice, and be readily implementable, 
such is the nature of computer storage. If such a system is serving the needs of 
a set of essentially independent users, competing against each other to access 
and perhaps update the database, then the now extensive literature on database 
transaction processing and protocols can provide a fertile source of well-
engineered, and mathematically well-founded, solutions to such error 
recovery problems [Gray and Reuter 1993]. 
However, the multiple activities in a decentralised system will often not 
simply be competing against each other for access to some shared internal 
resource, but rather will on occasion at least be attempting to co-operate with 
each other, in small or large groups, in pursuit of some common goal. This 
will make the provision of backward error recovery more complicated than is 
the case in basic transaction-oriented systems. And the problem of avoiding 
the “domino effect” [Randell 1975], in which a single fault can lead to a 
whole sequence of rollbacks, will be much harder if one cannot disallow (i.e. 
ignore) the possibility of undetected invalid communications between 
activities. 
When a system of interacting threads employs backward recovery, each 
thread will be continually establishing and discarding checkpoints, and may 
also on occasion need to restore its state to one given in a previously 
established and still-retained checkpoint. But if interactions are not controlled, 
and appropriately co-ordinated with checkpoint management, then the 
rollback of one thread to prior to a communication will necessitate that the 
other thread involved in that communication also rollback, and can possibly 
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result in a cascade of rollbacks that could push all the threads back to their 
beginnings, i.e., cause the domino effect to occur. (Compare the differing 
severity of threads T1 and T2, in Figure 1, having to go back to an earlier 
checkpoint.) 
However, the domino effect would not occur if it could safely be 
assumed that each thread’s data was fully validated before it was output, i.e. 
was transmitted from one thread to another. (Similarly, the effect would be 
avoided if a thread could validate its inputs fully.) Such an assumption is in 
effect made in simple transaction-based systems, in which outputs from the 
database thread to a user thread are allowed to occur only after a transaction 
has been “committed” in response to a user command. Moreover, in such 
systems the notion of commitment is regarded as absolute, so that once the 
commitment has been made, there is no going back, i.e. there is no provision 
for the possibility that a database output (or a user input) was invalid.  
inter-thread communication checkpoint
T1
T2
 
Figure 1: The domino effect 
The notion of nested transactions can be used to limit the amount of 
activity that has to be abandoned when backward recovery (of small inner 
transactions) is invoked. However, this notion typically still assumes that 
there are absolute “outermost” transactions, and that outputs to the world 
outside the database system, e.g. to the users, that take place after such 
outermost transactions end must be presumed to be valid.  
Now let us explore the consequences of a less restrictive scenario. The 
conversation scheme [Campbell and Randell 1986] provides a means of co-
ordinating the recovery provisions of interacting threads so as to avoid the 
domino effect, without making assumptions regarding inter-thread output or 
input validation. Figure 2 shows an example where three threads 
communicate within a conversation and the threads T1 and T2 communicate 
within a nested conversation. Communication can only take place between 
threads that are participating in a conversation together, so while T1 and T2 
are in their inner conversation they cannot damage or be damaged by T3.  
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inter-thread communication checkpoint
T1
T2
T3
conversation boundary acceptance test
 
Figure 2: Nested conversations 
The operation of a conversation is as follows: (i) on entry to a 
conversation a thread establishes a checkpoint; (ii) if an error is detected by 
any thread then all the participating threads must restore their checkpoints; 
(iii) after restoration all threads then attempt to make further progress; and 
(iv) all threads leave the conversation together, only if all pass any acceptance 
tests that are provided. (If this is not possible, the conversation fails - a 
situation which causes the enclosing conversation to invoke backward error 
recovery at its level.) 
Both transactions and conversations are examples of atomic actions 
[Lomet 1977], in that viewed from the outside they appear to perform their 
activity as a single indivisible action. (In practice transaction-support systems 
also implement other properties, such as “durability”, i.e. a guarantee that the 
results produced by completed transactions will not be lost as a result of a 
computer hardware fault.) And both rely on backward error recovery. 
However, systems are usually not made up just of computers - rather 
they will also involve other entities (e.g. devices and humans) which in many 
cases will not be able to simply forget some of their recent activity, and so 
simply go straight back to an exact earlier state when told that an error has 
been detected. Thus forward error recovery (the typical programming 
mechanism for which is exception handling), rather than backward recovery 
will have to be used. Each of these complications individually makes the task 
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of error recovery more difficult, and together they make it much more 
challenging. This in fact is the topic that I and my colleagues have 
concentrated on these last few years. 
Our resulting Co-ordinated Atomic (CA) Action scheme [Xu et al. 
1995] was arrived at as a result of work on extending the conversation 
concept so as to allow for the use of forward error recovery, and to allow for 
both co-operative and competitive concurrency, i.e. on relaxing the 
assumptions even further. CA actions can be regarded as providing a 
discipline, both for programming computers and for controlling their use 
within an organisation. This discipline is based on nested multi-threaded 
transactions [Caughey et al. 1998] together with very general exception 
handling provisions. Within the computer(s), CA actions augment any fault 
tolerance that is provided by the underlying transaction system by providing 
means for dealing with (i) unmasked hardware and software faults that have 
been reported to the application level to deal with, and/or (ii) application-level 
failure situations that have to be responded to. (However, detailed discussion 
of this topic is beyond the intended scope of this paper.) 
Conversations and CA Actions are methods of structuring the activity 
of a system, for purposes of error confinement and recovery. The initial issue 
with regard to system dependability concerns the structuring of the actual 
system itself. 
5. STRUCTURE 
A description of a system’s structure identifies its component systems, 
their observable boundaries and functions, and their means of interaction. 
Careful identification of system boundaries is fundamental to understanding 
and distinguishing between failures, faults and errors, so as to analyze 
possible or actual failure situations and find means of reducing their 
likelihood, especially in complex systems. System structuring thus plays a 
central role in dependability. 
Structure is in effect always “in the eye of the beholder”. Having 
identified a system’s boundary, one normally chooses to identify a 
structuring, in the form of a set of internal boundaries and interactions, which 
reflects knowledge or assumptions concerning how a system has been or 
might be constructed, and/or taken apart. Very often the components that are 
so identified might have had some previous separate existence, and have been 
chosen from among various possible alternatives. Structuring strategies that 
facilitate such choices have the additional advantage that they also tend to 
favour identification of components whose interfaces are seen as relatively 
simple and/or familiar. However, well-chosen structuring will not only have 
such characteristics but will also –on grounds of efficiency and effectiveness– 
identify sets of components that have low coupling and high cohesion. Such 
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well-chosen structuring greatly facilitates understanding of how a complex 
system functions. 
However, for structuring to have some direct relevance to questions of 
operational dependability, and in particular fault tolerance, it must be what 
might be described as strong – strong structuring actually controls 
interactions within and between systems, and limits error propagation in both 
time and space, i.e. constitutes real not just perceived or imagined boundaries. 
A well-known form of strong structuring is that provided by the 
watertight bulkheads in a ship. Clearly, these would do nothing for the ship’s 
seaworthiness, i.e. dependability, if they were constructed merely from 
cardboard (leave alone if they existed only in the blueprints and not in the 
actual ship), or if the rules regarding opening and closing of any doors that 
provided access through them were blithely ignored.  
The reality, and hence strength, of physical structure such as provided 
by bulkheads in ships, or by insulation in electronic systems, can be self-
evident. Software structures, as represented by source code constructs such as 
classes, objects, modules, etc., are more difficult to discern, but nevertheless if 
retained in some form and used as constraining mechanisms in the operational 
software can play a similar role in controlling interactions within complex 
computer systems. (Clearly this involves ensuring that the source code’s 
structuring is not destroyed by, for example, an optimising compiler.) 
All this is assuming that the implemented structuring actually matches 
the system designers’ intentions and assumptions regarding system structuring 
– something that is by no means certain to be the case with systems that are so 
large and complex as to be beyond any individual designer’s comprehension. 
Needless to say, inaccurate assumptions about a system’s actual structure can 
invalidate any or all coverage assessments that have been estimated on the 
basis of these assumptions. 
An even worse variant of the problem of inaccurate assumptions about 
a system’s structure arises if the original system structure (which perhaps was 
put in place at least in part as a defence against malicious faults e.g. due to 
network hackers) has in fact itself been maliciously subverted. At present, the 
main defences against malicious faults are structuring mechanisms such as 
firewalls and intrusion detectors, backed up by manual assessment and system 
recovery actions – actions that may take hours or even days during which the 
attacked system may not be operational.  
A current research priority therefore is that of finding effective 
automated means of tolerating malicious faults – this involves (i) defending 
the critical mechanisms, such as the intrusion detection system, against 
subversion, e.g. by replicating the services or making them difficult for an 
attacker to locate, and (ii) finding ways of masking or recovering from any 
errors caused by malicious faults, in order that system operation can be 
continued without the need for human intervention.  
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Progress has been made on means for providing a degree of such 
intrusion tolerance, for example in the MAFTIA (Malicious- and Accidental-
Fault Tolerance in Internet Applications) Project [Powell et al. 2001], and by 
the DARPA OASIS Program5. However, it is an open question as to what 
extent hackers’ inventiveness can be defeated by pre-designed automated 
defensive structuring. And one is always left with the conundrum that 
structuring is both a means of understanding, and of misunderstanding, 
systems. 
6. COMPUTER-BASED SYSTEMS 
Most large networked systems embody human beings as, in effect, 
system ‘components’, alongside the hardware and software components, 
though as indicated above such humans may become actively involved only 
when things go wrong with the computers and their communication. In other 
cases, there may be a deliberate decision to sub-divide some overall system 
task into activities that can be readily automated, and those that are best left to 
human beings to carry out. Systems that incorporate human ‘components’ in 
either of these ways are termed here computer-based systems. 
The various types of components of such systems have rather different 
failure characteristics: (i) hardware suffers mainly from ageing and wear, 
although logical design errors do sometimes persist in deployed hardware 
(see, for example, [Avizienis and He 1999]), (ii) it is mainly software that 
suffers from residual design and implementation errors, since this is, quite 
appropriately, where most of the logical complexity of a typical system 
resides, and (iii) human beings (users, operators, maintenance personnel and 
outsiders) can at times, through ignorance, incompetence or malevolence, 
cause untold damage. (Humans also can, with experience, compensate very 
effectively for computer system faults and failures.) Malevolent activities can 
range from acts of petty vandalism by amateur hackers, through the efforts of 
expert and highly devious virus creators, to well-resourced and highly 
sophisticated attacks by terrorists and enemy states. As indicated earlier, these 
constitute an increasingly serious problem.  
The successful design and deployment of any complex system that 
interacts directly with humans thus calls for socio-technical as well as 
technical expertise. One particular problem is that of how best to partition an 
overall task between humans and computers so as (i) to reduce the probability 
of failures due to misunderstandings across the human-machine interface, and 
(ii) to make best use of the greatly differing abilities that humans and 
computers have with respect to following complicated detailed sequences of 
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instructions, and recognising that a situation is both novel and potentially 
dangerous. 
Achieving predictable dependability from sophisticated computer-
based systems is therefore a major challenge, and a cynical summary is: if you 
automate a successful complex human-run system, the best you can possibly 
achieve is fewer but bigger failures. (An obvious example is a complex 
payroll system – manual payroll systems produce lots of inaccurate cheques, 
but none has ever generated one for £999,999,999.99.) Such large failures 
may be due to careless implementation, but the most difficult to avoid are 
those that are due to mistaken design assumptions. Yet many of the complex 
systems that are now being planned are computer-based systems, that 
automate many functions that were previously carried out manually, with all 
that this implies regarding the difficulty of achieving a high degree of 
continuity of operation of the global information infrastructure. 
7. SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS 
Large systems of any kind are rarely constructed de novo, but rather 
built up from earlier systems. Indeed, they are often actually constructed out 
of multiple pre-existing operational systems; hence, the term systems-of-
systems. Moreover, there is almost always a requirement for large systems to 
be capable of being adapted so as to match changes in requirements – due to 
changed functionality and changes in system environments – and there is 
likely to be an increasing need for systems that can themselves evolve. This is 
needed, for example, in order to serve a dynamic environment constituted by 
large numbers of mobile devices moving into and out of range. 
The typical process of constructing a system-of-systems out of systems 
that were not designed with this need in mind can best be described as 
involving “graunching”6. This is despite the existence of various more-or-less 
sophisticated tools and techniques, e.g. such software engineering 
mechanisms as brokerage services and wrappers. But the resulting systems-
of-systems, however put together, tend to suffer from their own special 
dependability problems.  
This is particularly the case when the individual systems are separately 
managed, and continue to function more or less independently, each with its 
own individual goals. In such circumstances, management decisions (e.g. 
regarding system shut-downs or changes) can in effect constitute an additional 
source of faults. 
Another new, or at least exacerbated, class of faults is that of 
mismatches at the interfaces between component systems. These are typically 
                                                      
6 To graunch (v.t.): to make to fit by the use of excessive force [WW2 RAF slang] 
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semantic (e.g. confusion between Fahrenheit and Celsius) not just syntactic, 
or due to fundamental policy incompatibilities. (There is in many quarters a 
present assumption that a middleware infrastructure facilitating the use of 
Web Services, XML, etc., will largely solve the problems of creating systems-
of-systems, but such facilities mainly help deal with syntax issues.) 
But there is also a totally insidious dependability problem caused by the 
fact that systems-of-systems may come into existence essentially accidentally. 
Interconnections may be made between systems, without due regard for the 
consequences, and have the result of creating an accidental system-of-
systems, indeed one of such utility it comes to be depended upon, even though 
there is no-one responsible for ensuring its dependability. And indeed this in 
part is exactly what has happened on a massive scale, as various separate 
critical national infrastructures (e.g. for energy, water, transportation, finance, 
information, etc.) have become much more inter-dependent than anyone had 
planned – hence the setting up of various national and international 
investigations into critical infrastructure interdependencies.  
8. INFRASTRUCTURE DEPENDABILITY 
The term infrastructure in general refers to an underlying set of 
general purpose facilities. It is a matter of viewpoint whether these facilities 
are regarded as a system or an infrastructure, since one organization’s system 
often becomes another organization’s infrastructure. 
 An infrastructure has connotations of being reusable by different 
individuals/organizations for different purposes on different occasions. 
Typically, not all of these uses are known to, or even the concern of, the 
designer(s) of the infrastructure, who therefore must create something that 
will respond to and support types of use that have not yet been conceived. 
Moreover, infrastructures typically need to be capacity engineered – so that 
the amount of resource can be changed to meet current and expected demand. 
(Over-deployment endangers the supplier, under-deployment frustrates the 
user.) 
All these uncertainties about the uses to be made of, and the demands to 
be placed on, an infrastructure exacerbate the problems of designing for 
dependability. Design decision-making often has to be based on very vague 
evidence and statistics, and very suspect assumptions, much more than is the 
case with systems that are designed for an identified owner and set of users. 
Evolvability and adaptability are usually crucial, but an additional 
dependability challenge. A particular problem is that, just as with ordinary 
systems, whatever analysis was undertaken in order to establish that an 
infrastructure is likely to be adequately dependable, may have to be redone 
virtually from scratch for a modified version of the infrastructure. (Ideally the 
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amount of reworking of the dependability analysis would be commensurate 
with the extent of the change.) 
Given the uncertainties as to the amounts and types of demand that an 
infrastructure may have to face, decisions involving trade-offs between the 
various attributes of dependability (e.g. between security and availability) are 
likely to be uninformed initially. In essence the problem is that infrastructure 
dependability also needs to be capacity engineered – and means provided of 
making effective trade-offs between the various dependability attributes, as 
their relative importance changes. This can be a major challenge. 
9. INFRASTRUCTURE AND STRUCTURE 
The ‘Idealized Fault-Tolerant Component’ diagram (see Figure 3) is a 
simple, indeed simplistic, structuring technique that shows one approach to 
distinguishing between various sorts of system interactions, in particular 
identifying and classifying those that relate to system activity aimed at error 
recovery. 
Normal Activity Exception Handling
Service   
requests
Normal   
responses
Interface  
exceptions
Failure    
exceptions
Return to normal
Local exceptions
Service   
requests
Normal   
responses
Interface  
exceptions
Failure    
exceptions  
Figure 3: Ideal Fault-Tolerant Component 
In fact the diagram relates to the “failure → fault → error” causal 
chains that can occur, either between systems and their components, or 
between interacting (though otherwise separate) systems. The terminology 
used is that of programmed exception handling, even though it can equally 
well relate to inter-system interaction protocols. It implies that is useful to 
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distinguish carefully between normal processing, and that involved in error 
recovery, and between normal and erroneous activations and activities of 
systems or system components.  
Given that an infrastructure is just a special kind of system, or rather a 
system viewed from a particular vantage point, the diagram can be used in 
connection with certain types of “failure → fault → error” chain between an 
infrastructure and the systems the infrastructure is supporting, namely chains 
related to failures in the systems being supported, or by infrastructure service 
failures.  
But we typically use the term ‘infrastructure’ for a system that is 
supporting, in the sense of initiating and/or enabling the continued effective 
existence of, some other system, not just interacting with it. This being the 
case, one can envisage a class of infrastructure failures that in effect destroy 
the supported systems or their means of communication (e.g. an electrical 
power blackout, a network outage, or a middleware crash). This class, which 
includes the case of one system being used to design or construct another, 
forms the third type of relationship across which “failure → fault → error” 
chains can operate (the others being system interaction relationships system 
and composition relationships) – and is one for which a richer more dynamic 
structuring concept diagram still has to be developed. 
10. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The main message of this paper is that when one is considering 
complex systems (and infrastructures), it is important to recognise that all the 
relevant concepts and entities – system, dependability, failure, fault, error, 
failure, structure, and infrastructure – are always to be understood as being 
relative to some current viewpoint, rather than having some fixed objective 
meaning. (Indeed even the notion of complexity, which is often spoken of as 
though it is a system property, in also relative, in that whether something is 
regarded as complex or simple depends on one’s knowledge and experience.) 
Moreover, every viewpoint implies a set of assumptions – not all of 
which will be recognised as such, despite efforts to provide high levels of 
assumption coverage. During system design, there may be differing 
assumptions as to the types of demand that will be placed on a system, and the 
value that will be placed on different system attributes, e.g. usability and 
security. The whole process of debugging a complex system involves the 
difficult task of identifying and often repeatedly modifying one’s assumptions 
as to how the system actually works and what possible faults would explain 
the failure symptoms, etc. And in complex situations different people may, 
quite understandably, come to different (equally defensible) conclusions, and 
hence propose alternative ways of repairing the system.  
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In particular, there will be assumptions about system structure, and 
these can be the most difficult ones to recognise and allow for. For example, a 
hacker who is trying to penetrate a system and obtain confidential data will by 
means of probes and experiments be building up one body of knowledge and 
assumptions about how the system is structured, in particular how its defences 
are organised. A system administrator will, through experience of the system, 
access to its documentation, etc., have a perhaps very different and much 
more detailed set of information about how the system is (assumed to be) 
structured. (And the hacker may well have found, or indeed managed to 
insert, vulnerabilities (i.e. faults) into the system, which in effect – did he or 
she but know it – completely invalidate the system administrator’s 
information and assumptions!)  
Complexity is the main enemy with regard to achieving dependable 
systems and infrastructures, and structure is one of the main means of 
mastering this complexity. In particular, good system structuring helps one to 
deal with the unavoidable additional complexity that results from adequately 
realistic fault assumptions.  
But it would seem that, particularly when one has to allow for 
malicious attacks by intelligent adversaries on a system’s or an 
infrastructure’s protective structuring, there are at least in principle some 
fundamental limitations as to what can be achieved solely by automated 
defences – assuming, surely rather reasonably, that these automated defences 
cannot be made to function with a level of intelligence (and deviousness) 
comparable to that of their human adversaries. 
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